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Risk, Standard Deviation, and Expected Value:
When Should an Individual Start Social Security?
Ted G. Eschenbach
University of Alaska Anchorage

Neal A. Lewis
Fairfield University

Abstract
In choosing when to start collecting social security, the differences in expected NPVs are
small—but the corresponding standard deviations are not. Starting earlier is less risky. The case
analyzed is single individuals in the U.S. system, but the methodology can be applied to couples
and to the systems of other nations. Considering risk and return together places social security in
the same risk/return framework as other capital investments. Behavioral, situational, and
qualitative factors that often dominate decisions on when to start are linked with quantitative
approaches to longevity risk and mortality risk.
Defining the problem
Social security is a U.S. government program providing retirement and other benefits to eligible
people. The choice of when to begin retirement benefits is up to the individual, and much has
been written about when to begin benefits. This work extends consideration of risk in the
decision framework.
The results presented here contribute to a specifically defined problem—when should a
single, eligible individual with the required 40 U.S. Social Security “credits or quarters” start
their retirement benefit. While benefits may begin in any given month, the exemplar choices are
collecting reduced benefits as early as age 62, receiving a primary insurance amount (PIA) by
waiting until full retirement age (the FRA is currently 66 with gradual increases beginning with
those who turn 66 in 2021), or delaying up to age 70 for enhanced payments. No article can do
more than contribute to an understanding of this problem and its solutions. There is too much
1

variety in individual situations and motivations, there are too many behavioral factors, there are
both qualitative and quantitative aspects, and different types of risk are best measured
differently. Examples are described as one of the limitations of this work.
This work specifically addresses the problem of what can be learned by considering both
expected values and standard deviations of incremental NPVs and IRRs. Previous work included
expected values of retirement benefits based on mortality data, but not the corresponding
standard deviations presented here. The large differences in standard deviations that are
demonstrated are more important than smaller differences in expected values. This work also
specifically addresses the problem of how to value social security benefits relative to other
retirement funding sources—which are normally characterized by their expected value and
standard deviation of historical or predicted annual returns. In contrast, the risks linked to social
security are often described in qualitative terms only. Analyzing incremental IRRs provides two
key results: (1) delaying benefits has negative expected IRRs and (2) delay has relatively large
standard deviations. The results of this work were stable when analyzed for the mortality data of
several demographic sub-groups that live longer or die sooner than average.
At a broad definition of the problem, this work’s methodology can be applied to any
nation’s pension or firm’s retirement system where the annual benefit received depends on the
age at which the recipient chooses to start benefits. This application only depends on the
individual having a choice and the analyst having the relevant mortality distribution(s) and
program details. Applying the methodology does not depend on how a national pension system
determines who is qualified nor on how benefit levels are calculated. Other national programs
are summarized in Social Security Administration (2016, 2017a, 2017b, and 2018a), which are
the most recent of the bi-annual updates for each of 4 world regions. While the work presented
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here focuses on single individuals within the U.S. social security system, the methodology could
be applied to those who are or were in a couple relationship where either partner is or will be
eligible to receive benefits such as spousal or survivor’s benefits in the U.S. system or in the
systems of other countries.
Previous work
System design and claimant behavior
The Social Security Administration’s website (ssa.gov) and publications are the most
authoritative source, but some of the clearest descriptions are found in material developed for
potential claimants. The first step in computing benefits is the individual’s average indexed
monthly earnings (AIME). This is based on the claimant’s highest 35 years of earnings (subject
to social security withholding), adjusted for inflation and for the claimant’s social security (SS)
income relative to average SS income in each year. In 2018 each $1320 of income subject to
social security taxes earns 1 credit up to a maximum of 4 credits per year. If there are only the
required 40 credits and they are concentrated in only 10 years, then 25 years of $0 are included
in calculating AIME. The full retirement age monthly benefit (maximum $2,927 in 2018) known
as the primary insurance amount (PIA) is computed from the maximum AIME of $9,936 (for
2018). Equation 1 and Figure 1 show how PIA is calculated, using ‘bend points’ ($895 and
$5,397) and multipliers (0.9, 0.32, and 0.15). If benefits start at age 62, benefits are reduced to
75% of the PIA; if benefits are delayed until age 70, benefits are enhanced to 132% of the PIA.
Each year the benefit received is adjusted for inflation and for any new income that increases the
AIME.
𝑃𝐼𝐴 = 0.9(895) + 0.32(5,397 – 895) + 0.15(9,936 – 5,397) = $2,927 for AIME = $9,936 (1)
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Figure 1. AIME to monthly PIA
A majority of people start social security benefits at their earliest opportunity (Coile et al.
2002; Knoll 2011; Muldoon and Kopcke 2008). For those 65 or older nearly 90% receive SS
benefits (Social Security Administration 2018b). With 10,000 people now turning 65 every day
(Cohn and Taylor 2010), this is a decision faced by many.
Claiming benefits before full retirement age is less attractive for those with income subject
to social security taxes. In the years before FRA, benefits are reduced by $1 for every $2 earned
over $17,040 per year (for 2018). In the year a person reaches FRA, benefits are reduced by $1
for every $3 earned over $45,360 (for 2018) in the months before FRA. The benefit reductions
are delayed benefits and not lost benefits (though spousal benefits may be lost). If benefits start
at or after FRA, then there are no income limits.
As assumed here, previous work assumed that analysis of starting before FRA is warranted
only if these income limits do not apply. Results are for a selected set of ages at death (Munnell
and Soto 2005; Novack 2011) or for average or median life expectancies (Meyer and
Reichenstein 2010; Shoven and Slavov 2012; Eschenbach, Lewis, and Zhang 2012). The social
4

security system was designed to be “benefit neutral” for single individuals. For these individuals
with an average age at death the NPV of benefits is roughly the same no matter when benefits
start (Cook, Jennings, and Reichenstein 2002; Jivan 2004; Sass, Sun, and Webb 2007).
Limitations of previous work and this work
Income taxes are not considered by this work as in most previous work; exceptions include
Boskin et al. (1987) and Kotlikoff (1996). The challenges of considering income taxes include:
(1) the proportion of social security benefits taxed is 0%, 50%, or 85% depending on income, (2)
the marginal tax rate depends on total taxable income, (3) different states tax 0% to 100% of the
benefits, and (4) individuals pay taxes at different rates over their time of receiving benefits.
There are situations where federal income taxes provide an incentive to delay or start benefits. If
income and tax rates are high now, but will drop significantly after the individual retires, then
delay looks better. If income is low now and required minimum distributions will trigger higher
tax rates, then starting early looks better.
This work and much of the previous work considers only single individuals and does not
include those who are or were in a couple relationship where either partner is or will be eligible
to receive spousal or survivor’s benefits. These benefits are in addition to the retirement benefit
of individuals (Lewis and Eschenbach 2013). Applying the methodology used here to couples
would require considering the ages and PIAs of both partners and more complex strategies
described in Reichenstein and Meyer (2017), which are beyond the scope of this work.
Like previous work on recommended strategies, this work does not address provisions that
may affect eligibility and the level of benefits. Examples of issues that are not addressed include
the governmental pension offset (GPO), the windfall elimination provision (WEP), and
consideration of military service.
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Previous work has described mortality risk as the risk of collecting less (or nothing) if you
die earlier than expected. Friedman and Phillips (2010) found that there are negative yields for
many years from a one-year delay of benefits and that risk-averse people should start social
security benefits as soon as income penalties end. The work presented here focuses on one
measure of risk—the standard deviation of possible NPVs and IRRs. There are other measures,
such as the semivariance, which only considers deviations below the average. While
semivariance is not addressed further, it would emphasize that a delay in starting benefits would
risk collecting little or nothing in the event of an early death. Opportunity loss (another measure
of risk) has been used to calculate break-even ages at death (Alleva 2015).
It has been argued in the popular press that starting benefits earlier reduces the risk of
receiving less due to program changes. However when the value of benefits has been lowered in
the past, “grandfathering” of current recipients and long periods before implementation have
been common. For example, raising the full retirement age from 65 to 67 was discussed for
years, signed into law in 1983 (Dewitt, 2010), first raised to 65 years and 2 months in 2000, and
the last currently scheduled change to 67 occurs in 2022.
This and previous work cannot judge the relative importance of behavioral, qualitative, and
quantitative factors that may contribute to or dominate the choice of when to start benefits. This
work can and does address the lesser importance of the expected value as compared with the
standard deviation when considered together as quantitative measures for single individuals
choosing a starting age.
This work recognizes that individual decisions and more general recommendations require
a more wholistic view. The proper balance of factors in a particular decision depends on
individual situations and motivations. How much does a person may want to leave for heirs?
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What is their risk attitude toward running out of money? How important are the expected value
and standard deviation of the retirement benefit? While many decisions are made with
incomplete knowledge and understanding, the authors assert that the following examples
illustrate why many individuals start benefits at or before FRA. Claiming benefits earlier can (1)
allow retirement and more time for desired activities; (2) support activities before health and
vigor declines; (3) preserve money “in the bank” for events requiring a lump sum rather than a
higher monthly benefit; (4) maximize benefits in the face of a terminal illness or life-shortening
health problems; and (5) preserve current investments for bequests if the investments are not
needed for later living expenses (Lockwood 2011). Ahn and Yoon (2011) describe an analogous
tradeoff between labor, leisure, and investment. Claiming benefits later (1) is a form of required
saving and (2) is a form of longevity insurance—which is addressed more fully in the next
section.
From a more academic perspective, it is suggested that (1) regret of possible losses is often
larger than the value of similarly sized gains (Bell 1982); and (2) collecting social security is an
annuity and like most economic goods it is subject to decreasing marginal utility (Kauder 1953).
Thus collecting incrementally more annuity insurance from delaying benefits will have a lower
marginal value than the basic benefit.
Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) use heterogeneity in time preferences measured by
discount rates to explain why individuals prefer to start benefits early. Other work that focuses
on including risk in a variety of contexts includes Gradl, et al. (2009), Ho and Pike (1998), and
Lohmann and Baksh (1993).

7

Longevity risk
How does an individual support themselves if they live longer than expected? This longevity risk
can be addressed with annuities that are priced for those that expect a disproportionately long
life. Annuities are promoted as a hedge against longevity risk, but payouts average 81¢ per dollar
invested (Mitchell et al. 1999) in contrast with the positive returns expected from investments.
Another approach is to delay social security benefits to maximize the monthly payment (Sun and
Webb 2009; Meyer and Reichenstein 2010). Delaying social security is a “free” annuity, because
the expected values for different starting dates change so little (Sun and Webb 2011). If
longevity risk is the dominant concern, then benefits should not be started until age 70. However,
from early annuity work (Yaari 1965) it is usually assumed that the consumer has no bequest
motive, and thus sees no value to wealth after death (Davidoff et al. 2005). In fact, most people
do have a bequest motive; it is estimated that 75% of elderly single households want to leave a
positive net worth estate for their heirs (Kopczuk and Lupton 2007).
Manakyan et al. (2014) addressed longevity risk by simulating outcomes of starting
benefits late vs. early and investing in portfolios ranging from all bonds to all stocks at survival
ages of 86, 91, and 96. In most cases, claiming early and investing mainly in stocks was the best
strategy. In contrast, Blanchett (2012) concluded starting benefits early and investing would earn
9.15% less than delaying benefits for a hypothetical married couple.
The analysis of longevity risk is complicated by the fact that there are behavioral answers
to, “How does an individual support themselves if they live longer than expected?” For example,
some retirees believe that moving in with family as health and assets decline is not just expected,
but valued. As another example, claiming benefits earlier may be possible because near and
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long-term behavior can be adjusted to match near and long-term income and expenditures.
Travel or meals out can be adjusted as needed to be rare and cheap or common and expensive.
The work presented here does not suggest that longevity risk can be ignored. However,
balancing longevity risk with other factors requires consideration of bequest motives and
possible behavioral changes. The authors assert the fundamental importance of recognizing that
retirement benefits, even when started early, do address longevity risk. Delaying benefits simply
gains incremental reductions in longevity risk.
Assumptions
Assumptions described previously include: a single individual starting benefits of 0.75×PIA at
62, of 1×PIA at 66, or of 1.32×PIA at 70; results are pre-tax; and a PIA that equals the monthly
maximum of $2927 (annual total = $35,124). Results for intermediate ages can be interpolated
(though minor maximums can occur), and all results stated in dollars can be scaled to match any
lower PIA.
For ease of computation, we assume that the individual’s 62nd birthday is January 2nd so
that the person will receive a full first year’s benefit (SSA, 2004). If a birthday of January 1st is
assumed, then the bend points (see Equation 1) for the previous year must be used. Matching
assumptions of end-of-year cash flows and end-of-year deaths are made in order to match the
annual mortality data. Note that assuming mid-year or monthly cash flows would increase the
economic value of benefits by a factor of about 1 + i/2 (where i is the real interest rate), thus
relative and incremental expected values will not change. Standard deviations will simply
increase by the multiplicative factor, which is close to 1 so relative values will change little.
Conditional probabilities regarding age at death assume a person is alive at 62, and are
calculated using current mortality data (2014) from the National Vital Statistics System (Arias,
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2017). If similarly reliable monthly data were available or deaths were assumed to be mid-year,
then the final year of benefits would be approximately halved. This does decrease the economic
value of the benefit stream, so this is an assumption that is an opportunity for further research.
Because social security benefits do receive cost of living adjustments, all benefits are stated
in constant value dollars. A real interest rate of 3% is assumed for most computations, as that has
been commonly used in the literature and by the Social Security Administration (Cook, Jennings,
and Reichenstein 2002; Munnell and Soto 2005; Sass, Sun, and Webb 2008).
For descriptive purposes, the first results presented are for the net present value of benefits
at starting ages of 62, 66, and 70. This also supports a very important point. These results cannot
be used to calculate the standard deviation of incremental benefits, as that would incorrectly
assume independent, identically distributed random variables for age at death for each starting
age. Instead, the correct assumption is to assume a single random variable for age at death and
then calculate the incremental NPVs or IRRs. This is analogous to a paired difference model.
Expected NPV and risk
Equation 1 defines the annual benefit (APIA) that is received from the age at start (s) until the
age at death (d). Equation 2 details the calculation of the benefit stream’s NPV. Because of
annual compounding, benefits are considered at the end of the year received, so benefits received
during age 62 are identified as year 63. Thus, age 62 is time 0, and 63 is the end of period 1.
Table 1 shows example conditional probabilities for age at death given that a person is alive at
62, derived from the NVSS data (Arias, 2017). In particular, note that the probability of dying
before collecting (shown in Table 2) is 4.48% for starting benefits at age 66 (= 0.0103 + 0.0109
+ 0.0115 + 0.0121 from Table 1). Similarly, the probability of dying before age 70 (assuming
being alive at 62) is 10.12%.
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𝐴𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑠 = 12 × {0.75, 1, 1.32} × 𝑃𝐼𝐴 for 𝑠 = 62, 66, 70
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑠,𝑑 =

1
(1 +

𝑑

∑
𝑖)𝑠−62
(1
𝑡=𝑠

𝐴𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑠
+ 𝑖)𝑡−62

for 𝑑 = [63,101]

(2)

(3)

Table 1. Example conditional dying probabilities given alive at 62 derived from NVSS data for
all individuals.
Year
Year
ending
P(die|62)
ending
P(die|62)
at Age
at Age
63
0.0103
94
0.0318
64
0.0109
95
0.0284
65
0.0115
96
0.0246
66
0.0121
97
0.0208
67
0.0128
98
0.0171
68
0.0136
99
0.0136
69
0.0145
100
0.0105
70
0.0155
≥101
0.0242
Figure 2 is the basis of the first major conclusion. For single individuals, differences in
standard deviation are much larger and thus more important than the much smaller differences in
expected value for different starting ages. Recall that the preferred direction on the return (or yaxis) is up and on the standard deviation (or x-axis) is to the left. Figure 2 shows that at a 3% real
interest rate the expected values (measured on the y-axis) are virtually equivalent for each
starting age, but the standard deviations are not. Only at 0% do we see the “normal” tradeoff
between risk and return where expecting a higher return is paired with a higher risk. Again, small
increases in NPV are paired with large increases in risk. At a 6% real interest rate, starting as
early as possible is a dominant strategy considering these two measures with higher expected
returns and lower risks.
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Figure 2. NPV’s risk and expected return for total population for starting ages of 62, 66, and 70
at real interest rates of 0%, 3%, and 6%.
Table 2 details the descriptive statistics for this data. If this were to be used to calculate
the incremental difference between starting at 62 and 66, the expected value difference of $5821
(= 390,531 – 384,710) would be correct. However, it would be wrong to calculate the standard
deviation of the difference as $215,403 = √131,2272 + 170,1862 because the variables are
not independent. The next section presents results for this work’s assumption of a single
conditional probability distribution for each class of individuals.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the NPV of benefits at 3% real interest.
Start 62
Start 66
Start 70
Expected NPV
$384,710
$390,531
$379,019
Std. dev.
$131,227
$170,186
$205,574
P(die before start)
0
4.48%
10.12%

Incremental NPV
Calculating incremental NPVs for each year of death is simply the difference between two
applications of Equations 2 and 3—an earlier start at 62 or 66 and a later start at 66 or 70. Unlike
the mortality distributions which depend on gender, the NPV calculations do not. Thus, there is
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only one set of ∆NPVs for each incremental comparison. The increment order is chosen to match
the normal engineering economic incremental assumption that each increment is an investment.
In this case, the investment is forgoing earlier year payments to qualify for larger payments in
later years. The results in Table 3 are for the maximum PIA, but they can be scaled for any other
PIA value.
Table 3. Incremental NPVs at 3% real interest.
∆NPV66 − 62
∆NPV70 − 66
Die at
63
−$24,361
$0
64
−$48,013
$0
65
−$70,976
$0
66
−$93,269
$0
67
−$86,055
−$28,859
68
−$79,050
−$56,878
69
−$72,249
−$84,081
70
−$65,647
−$110,492

Die at
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
≥101

∆NPV66 − 62
$46,172
$49,326
$52,387
$55,360
$58,246
$61,048
$63,768
$66,409

∆NPV70 − 66
$32,627
$36,663
$40,582
$44,386
$48,080
$51,666
$55,148
$58,528

Table 4 summarizes the results for the total population and by gender by applying each
category’s conditional probabilities. Delaying from 66 to 70 results in a negative E(∆NPV) in all
of these cases. Delaying from 62 to 66 results in either negative or significantly smaller
E(∆NPV) than the corresponding standard deviations. Note that the standard deviations, while
large compared to the expected values, are substantially smaller than the $215,403 that was
calculated for hypothetical independent probability distributions.

Table 4. Summary statistics for incremental NPV at 3% real interest.
Total population
Female
66 − 62
70 − 66
66 − 62
70 − 66
E(∆NPV)
$5,821
−$11,512
$11,169
−$6,299
$38,994
$42,176
Std. dev.
$40,004
$42,533
3.49
−6.70
Coef. Var.
6.87
−3.69

Male
66 − 62
−$185
$40,078
−216.77

70 − 66
−$17,431
$41,951
−2.41
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It is these results that specifically address the problem of what can be learned by
considering both expected values and standard deviations of incremental NPVs. The larger
differences in standard deviations that are demonstrated are more important than smaller
differences in expected values. These results contribute to the solution of when a single
individual should start social security.
Incremental rate of return
This section addresses the problem of how to value social security benefits relative to other
retirement funding sources—which are normally characterized by the expected value and
standard deviation of historical or predicted annual returns. Analyzing incremental IRRs
provides two key results: (1) delaying benefits has negative expected IRRs and (2) delay has
relatively large standard deviations. Delaying benefits results in both lower expected returns and
higher standard deviations than for other retirement investments.
The higher risk of social security is particularly notable because the older an individual, the
more conservative the recommended investment portfolio becomes. Bear markets (time periods
where stock prices are decreasing) are part of the volatility of long-term investing; however, a
bear market just before or during retirement can shrink portfolios below what is needed for a
retiree’s well-made plan. At the average age at death, delaying starting benefits is similar to
living in a bear market during much of retirement.
Because incremental IRR analysis is based on cash flows, it is easiest to use the PIA
multipliers of 75%, 100%, and 132% for starting at 62, 66, and 70 respectively. Starting benefits
at age 66 (= time 0) means forgoing the 75% benefit that could have been received at 63, 64, 65,
and 66. Instead, 25% more is received from 67 until death. Similarly waiting until age 70 instead
of starting at 66 means forgoing the 100% that could have been received at 67, 68, 69, and 70.
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Instead 32% more is received from 71 until death.
Equations 4 and 5 are solved to find the incremental IRRs if death occurs after positive
incremental benefits are started. If death occurs before the delayed benefits are started, then the
∆IRR cannot be calculated; however, this is conceptually a complete “loss of investment” or
complete “loss of the opportunity to receive benefits” or a −100% incremental IRR. Again,
benefits are considered at the end of the year received, so benefits qualified for at a time 0 of age
62 are identified as year 63. Note that representative values shown in Table 5 do not depend on
any mortality distribution.
66

∆𝐼𝑅𝑅66−62

∆𝐼𝑅𝑅70−66

𝑡=63

𝑡=67

70

𝑑

−1
0.32
= 𝑖 such that 0 = ∑
+
∑
for 𝑑 ≥ 71
(1 + 𝑖)𝑡−66
(1 + 𝑖)𝑡−70
𝑡=66

Table 5. Incremental IRRs.
∆IRR66 − 62
Die at
63
−100%
64
−100%
65
−100%
66
−100%
67
−74.9%
68
−48.6%
69
70

𝑑

−0.75
1
= 𝑖 such that 0 = ∑
+ ∑
for 𝑑 ≥ 67
𝑡−62
(1 + 𝑖)
(1 + 𝑖)𝑡−67

−33.6%
−24.0%

∆IRR70 − 66
−100%
−100%
−100%
−100%

(4)

(5)

𝑡=71

Die at
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
≥101

∆IRR66 − 62
6.2%
6.3%
6.4%
6.5%
6.6%
6.6%
6.7%
6.8%

∆IRR70 − 66
5.2%
5.4%
5.6%
5.7%
5.8%
6.0%
6.1%
6.2%

Figure 3 graphs the incremental IRR vs. age at death. This emphasizes that if an individual
dies within 16 years of making the decision to delay (age 78 for delaying from 62 to 66, and 82.5
for delaying from 66 to 70) delay has a negative incremental IRR—often extremely negative. On
15

the other hand, living into your 90’s only earns positive incremental rates of return of about 5%
to 7% (see also Friedman and Phillips 2010). A real interest rate of 3% was used as the MARR
for NPV calculations, and it can be used as a hurdle rate for the IRR. Delaying from age 62 to 66
achieves a 3% IRR at age 81.0 (when the general population has a 40.0% probability of being
deceased), and delaying from 66 to 70 achieves a 3% IRR at age 85.8 (with a 59.3% probability
of being deceased).

20%

82.5

78.0

Incremental IRR

0%
-20%
∆IRR66 − 62

-40%

∆IRR70 − 66

-60%
-80%
-100%
60

65

70

Age at Death

75

80

85

90

95

100

• E(∆IRR66 − 62 |Male) o E(∆IRR66 − 62 |Female)
 E(∆IRR70 − 66 |Male) Δ E(∆IRR70 − 66 |Female)

Figure 3. Incremental IRR vs. age at death.
Figure 3 also includes the expected IRR for both genders and both incremental choices
plotted at the expected ages at death. Because these values do depend on the mortality
distributions, it should be noted that the probabilities used for ∆IRR70−66 are age at death given
alive at 66 rather than the given alive at 62 used previously. Table 6 details the expected return
and standard deviations for the incremental IRRs.
Table 6. Summary statistics for incremental IRR.
Total
Female
66 − 62
70 − 66
66 − 62
70 − 66
E(∆IRR)
−6.65%
−11.00%
−2.43%
−6.22%
Std. dev.
26.5%
29.1%
21.7%
24.8%

Male
66 − 62
−4.45%
24.2%

70 − 66
−8.48%
27.0%
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Impact of race, individual health, and heredity
The prior analysis has focused on mortality risk for an “average” individual, male or female.
Decision-making by individuals can consider more specific indicators such as likely life span.
There are lifestyle choices (tobacco, drugs, exercise, etc.) and family histories that can shift the
mortality expectation for an individual. These differences are difficult to characterize, but
mortality distributions for demographic sub-populations can be used for insight into how
incremental NPV and IRR results shift with the mortality distributions of individuals. There are
groups with shifted mortality curves from the population at large. As shown in Figure 4, black
males have a mortality curve that is shifted towards earlier death, and Hispanic females have a
mortality curve that is shifted towards later death, all given that the person is alive at 62. Thus,
they represent somewhat lower and higher life spans. The difference in their median age at death
is 8.15 years. Use of this data was prompted by Docking, Fortin, and Michelson (2011), which
also included the use of incremental IRRs.

Cumulative probability of dying
(alive at 62)

100%

75%
Black Male

50%

Male
Female

25%

Hispanic Female

8.15 yrs
0%
60

70

80

90

100

Age at Death

Figure 4. Mortality curves for four groups; assumes alive at 62.
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Table 7 summarizes the results for incremental NPV analyses for the total population and 4
sub-populations. Most of the expected incremental NPVs are negative. The four that are positive
have large coefficients of variation ranging from 1.93 to 13.13. The results for black males have
more negative expected values than all males and slightly larger standard deviations. Only for
Hispanic females does the E(∆NPV) exceed half of the standard deviation.
Table 7. NPV results for different mortality curves.
Delay from 62 to 66
Group
Black Male
Male
Total
Female
Hispanic Female

E(∆NPV)
−$8,947
−$185
$5,821
$11,169
$19,696

σ
$41,924
$40,078
$40,004
$38,994
$38,018

Delay from 66 to 70

CV
−4.85
−216.77
6.87
3.49
1.93

E(∆NPV)
−$23,984
−$17,431
−$11,512
−$6,299
$3,179

σ
$43,095
$41,951
$42,533
$42,176
$41,737

CV
−1.80
−2.41
−3.69
−6.70
13.13

Table 8 summarizes the incremental IRRs for the total population and 4 sub-populations.
All of the expected incremental IRRs are negative, all of the standard deviations are large, and
the coefficients of variation range from −2.06 to −51.68. The smallest standard deviation is
19.3% (for Hispanic females, when delaying from 62 to 66). None of the delay strategies is
attractive for any of the groups. Raising the median age at death to nearly 89 (Hispanic females)
or lowering it to 80 (Black males) does not change the conclusion.

Table 8. Incremental IRRs for different mortality curves.
Delay from 62 to 66

Delay from 66 to 70

Group
EV
σ
CV
EV
σ
CV
Black Male
−11.5% 31.0% −2.70 −16.1% 33.1% −2.06
Male
−6.6% 26.5% −3.99 −11.0% 29.1% −2.65
Total
−4.5% 24.2% −5.44
−8.5% 27.0% −3.19
Female
−2.4% 21.7% −8.92
−6.2% 24.8% −3.99
Hispanic Female −0.4% 19.3% −51.68 −3.3% 21.8% −6.55
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The conclusion that smaller differences in expected value are less important than larger
differences in risk seems to be robust. In addition, when considering individual circumstances,
health and longevity issues are more likely to be identified in the short-term than in a possible
future that is 30 years or more away.
Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Work
Expected values and standard deviations have long been used together to evaluate investments,
capital projects, and alternative engineering design choices—but not when to start collecting
social security benefits. This work adds consideration of the standard deviations of ∆NPVs and
∆IRRs for evaluating when to start collecting U.S. social security benefits for single individuals.
•

As confirmed in this work, previous work has shown that expected NPV values for
different starting ages are similar. Thus, ∆NPVs for delay are small. In contrast, the
standard deviations presented here are larger with coefficients of variation ranging
from 1.93 to 13.31 for ∆NPVs that are positive. If the ∆NPVs are negative, then any
level of risk indicates that delay is a dominated alternative when evaluated by these
two criteria.

•

∆IRRs have been previously presented for delaying benefits, but without calculating
standard deviations. By these measures starting early is clearly better. Expected
∆IRRs for 5 mortality distributions are all negative—ranging from −3.3% to
−16.1%. The standard deviations are large—ranging from 19.3% to 33.1%.

•

For ages before the full retirement age, the expected values and standard deviations
do not imply that someone should retire in order to begin collecting. The income
from working is very likely to exceed social security benefits.
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•

Social security may be the only source of retirement income, or it may be part of an
individual’s retirement planning that includes an investment portfolio composed of
assets, such as stocks, bonds, and Treasury bills. Historical and projected
performance of such assets is most commonly measured by expected returns and
the standard deviations of return. Knowing the ∆IRRs expected return and standard
deviation for social security decisions is a starting point in considering social
security as part of an investment portfolio.

•

While differences in risk are greater than differences in expected return, these
quantitative results must be considered in a broader framework. This work has
described some of the most important behavioral and qualitative factors that may
contribute to or dominate the choice of when to start benefits. Only individuals
know their situation and their motivations.

•

It is fundamentally important to recognize that retirement benefits, even when
started early, address longevity risk. Delaying benefits gains incremental reductions
in longevity risk while incrementally increasing mortality risk.

•

Because this work is about decision-making by individuals, a key question is how
much are the results influenced by mortality distributions shifted to earlier or later
death. Such shifts are an important part of the behavioral and qualitative factors that
must be considered. Some level of individual differences corresponds with
differences in mortality distributions for gender and racial subgroups. At least at
this level of difference, the results for expected values and standard deviation were
consistent with results for females, males, and the total population.
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•

The insight that standard deviations can be calculated using the same data used for
expected total benefits and considered together with the expected values can be
applied to other applications of mortality distributions. However, it is necessary to
calculate ∆NPVs and ∆IRRs before a mortality distribution for age at death is
applied to calculate expected values and standard deviations. Applying the mortality
distribution to each starting choice independently is only of descriptive
importance—not a valid way to calculate standard deviations of incremental
choices.

Some of the following suggestions for further work are straightforward to execute while
others are likely to be very challenging. To some extent, the suggestions are ordered by the
expected level of difficulty. These are presented as examples—not as a comprehensive set.
•

Consider single individuals under the retirement system of another country that
allows individuals to choose when to start receiving benefits and where those
benefits depend on when they start. The rules, available choices, the mortality
distributions, the expected values, the standard deviations, etc. may all be
different—but the methodology should be applicable.

•

Consider choices for couples who are or were in a relationship where benefits such
as the U.S. SSA’s spousal and survivor’s benefits are available. For example, in the
U.S. after 9 months of marriage a new spouse can qualify for survivor’s benefits
and after 1 year for spousal benefits. After 10 years of marriage a divorced spouse
can claim spousal or survivor’s benefits if unmarried and 62. Because of the
complexity of potential strategies and the myriad combinations of ages and SS
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earnings, it is suggested that special cases such as spouses with the same age be
analyzed first.
•

An assumption of independent mortality distributions is a likely starting point for
analysis of choices for couples. However, there is evidence that the distributions are
not independent. Most clearly, both partners may die with a common cause such as
an auto accident. Even without a common cause there is some level of correlation.
Nevertheless, computing incremental differences between choices before
calculating expected values and standard deviations seems necessary.

•

Portfolio theory is well developed for financial assets, but the right to receive
benefits from social security is a completely different type of asset with a mortality
distribution rather than market performance as the driver of uncertainty. Is there a
way to integrate these or at least consider both when making choices in both? For
example, being qualified for a higher social security benefit might imply that a
higher level of financial risk would be acceptable. This is of particular interest
because a common investment guideline is that exposure to more volatile assets
such as stocks should shrink as age increases.
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